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Reframing Public Inquiries as 
‘Procedural Justice’ for Victims 
of Institutional Child Abuse: 
Towards a Hybrid Model of Justice 
Anne-Marie McAlinden and Bronwyn Naylor† 
Abstract 
As the number of high profile cases of institutional child abuse mounts 
internationally, and the demands of victims for justice are heard, State 
responses have ranged from prosecution, apology, and compensation schemes, 
to truth commissions or public inquiries. Drawing on the examples of Australia 
and Northern Ireland as two jurisdictions with a recent and ongoing history of 
statutory inquiries into institutional child abuse, this article utilises the 
restorative justice paradigm to critically evaluate the strengths and limitations 
of the inquiry framework in providing ‘justice’ for victims. The article critically 
explores the normative and pragmatic implications of a hybrid model as a more 
effective route to procedural justice. It suggests that an appropriately designed 
restorative pathway may enhance the legitimacy and utility of the public inquiry 
model for victims chiefly by improving offender accountability and ‘voice’ for 
victims. The article concludes by offering some thoughts on the broader 
implications for other jurisdictions in responding to large-scale historical abuses 
and seeking to come to terms with the legacy of institutional child abuse. 
I Introduction 
A A Hybrid Approach 
Since at least the 1990s, institutional child abuse by the clergy, in particular 
members of Catholic religious orders,1 has impacted in a range of jurisdictions 
including the United States (‘US’),2 Canada,3 the Netherlands,4 England and 
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1 Institutional abuse, however, is by no means confined to this particular religious context. See, eg, 
Patrick Parkinson, Kim Oats and Amanda Jayakody, ‘Study of Reported Sexual Abuse in the 
Anglican Church’ (Report, Anglican Church, May 2009) <http://www.apo.org.au/research/study-
reported-child-sexual-abuse-anglican-church>. 
2 John Jay College of Criminal Justice, ‘The Nature and Scope of the Problem of Sexual Abuse of 
Minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the United States 1950–2002’ (Research Study, City 
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Wales,5 and the Republic of Ireland.6 Official responses to institutional child abuse 
have drawn from a range of reparative and legal frameworks. These have included 
political apologies on behalf of the State, the establishment of statutory 
compensation schemes, a small number of prosecutions of individual perpetrators, 
and the setting up of truth or investigatory commissions or inquiries. Collectively, 
such State responses to historic abuses have constituted an emerging 
interdisciplinary sub-field within the broader domain of transitional justice.7 
Australia and Canada, for example, have used a mixture of public apology, 
reparation, compensation and truth commission as responses to clerical sexual 
abuse as well as institutional child abuse against indigenous peoples.8 In the US, 
victims have sought redress via the civil courts where many parishes have gone 
into bankruptcy paying out large sums of victim compensation.9 The dominant 
model for responding to institutional child sexual abuse in many jurisdictions, 
however, is the judge-led public inquiry, with the attendant possibility of 
subsequent prosecutions, compensation and public apology. 
Many victims, however, have needs that are not met by the public inquiry 
process, which typically has more wide-reaching aims and objectives than 
addressing harm to individual victims.10 In tandem with critiques of State justice 
more broadly,11 the case for restorative justice as applied to institutional child 
abuse is founded on the failure of adversarial processes and the greater potential of 
																																																																																																																																
University of New York, February 2004); John Jay College of Criminal Justice, ‘The Causes and 
Context of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests in the United States, 1950–2010’ (Report, 
City University of New York, May 2011). 
3 Law Commission of Canada, Restoring Dignity: Responding to Child Abuse in Canadian 
Institutions (2000). 
4 Wim Deetman et al, ‘Sexual Abuse of Minors in the Roman Catholic Church’ (Final Report, 
Commission of Inquiry, 2011). For a summary of the report in English, see 
<http://www.onderzoekrk.nl/fileadmin/commissiedeetman/data/downloads/eindrapport/20111216/ 
Samenvatting_eindrapport_Engelstalig.pdf>. 
5 Lord Nolan, ‘A Programme for Action: Final Report of the Independent Review on Child Protection 
in the Catholic Church in England and Wales’ (Report, Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England 
and Wales, 2001) <http://www.cathcom.org/mysharedaccounts/cumberlege/finalnolan1.htm>. 
6 Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse 
(2009) <http://www.childabusecommission.ie/>.  
7 Johanna Sköld, ‘Historical Abuse — A Contemporary Issue: Compiling Inquiries into Abuse and 
Neglect of Children in Out-of-Home Care Worldwide’ (2013) 14(Supp 1) Journal of Scandinavian 
Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 5; James Gallen, ‘Jesus Wept: The Roman Catholic 
Church, Child Sexual Abuse and Transitional Justice’ (2016) 10(2) International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 332 <http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/03/07/ijtj.ijw003>. 
8 Jennifer J Llewellyn, ‘Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential School Abuse in Canada: 
Litigation, ADR and Restorative Justice’ (2002) 52(3) University of Toronto Law Journal 253; 
Rosemary Nagy and Robinder Kaur Sehdev, ‘Introduction: Residential Schools and 
Decolonization’ (2012) 27(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Society 67. 
9 See, eg, Tom Roberts, ‘Milwaukee Eighth Diocese to File for Bankruptcy’, National Catholic 
Reporter (online), 5 January 2011 <https://www.ncronline.org/news/accountability/milwaukee-
eighth-diocese-file-bankruptcy>. 
10 Stephen Sedley, ‘Public Inquiries: A Cure or a Disease?’ (1989) 52(4) Modern Law Review 469; 
Geoffrey Howe, ‘The Management of Public Inquiries’ (1999) 70(3) The Political Quarterly 294; 
Iain Steele, ‘Judging Judicial Inquiries’ [2004] (4) Public Law 738. 
11 John Braithwaite and Kathleen Daly, ‘Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian Control’ in Tim 
Newburn and Elizabeth A Stanko (eds), Just Boys Doing Business? Men, Masculinity and Crime 
(Routledge, 1994) 189; Anne-Marie McAlinden, The Shaming of Sexual Offenders: Risk, 
Retribution and Reintegration (Hart, 2007). 
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restoration in addressing the needs of victims in more cases. The focus of this 
article is to explore the potential contribution of restorative principles to the public 
inquiry framework at a conceptual and operational level. Our core task is two-fold: 
(1) to critically analyse the benefits and limitations of the public inquiry 
framework in providing ‘justice’ for victims of institutional child abuse drawing on 
the experience of two jurisdictions that are currently in the midst of high profile 
statutory inquiries — Australia and Northern Ireland; and (2) more particularly, to 
propose a hybrid model of justice that incorporates a restorative avenue as a 
component of the inquiry process. We argue that a hybrid approach to procedural 
justice can be utilised to enhance the utility and legitimacy of public inquiries and 
improve the position of victims within the inquiry setting. While a restorative 
pathway cannot guarantee victims of mass crimes all of the outcomes they might 
seek, it can provide a broader range of outcomes than conventional justice 
processes in ensuring that victims perceive the proceedings as fair. 
Advocating the need for a hybrid system of justice that encompasses 
elements of both restorative justice and the formal public inquiry rubric raises 
significant questions of law and procedure in terms of how such a holistic approach 
could work in practice. Of particular relevance is the challenging relationship 
between formal and informal justice systems, with restorative justice requiring 
additional protections and safeguards. Chief among these, and consistent with the 
United Nations’ Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice in Criminal 
Matters,12 are the careful selection of cases13 and criteria for referral;14 the 
consideration of power imbalances between the parties;15 and fundamental 
procedural safeguards for the offender and the victim such as free and informed 
consent,16 protection from future legal proceedings,17 and the right to consult with 
legal counsel.18 The pragmatic implications of achieving a synergy between the 
public inquiry and restorative paradigms and of addressing these normative 
principles will be returned to below. 
B Definitions and the Comparative Approach 
To begin, however, we should define terms. The term ‘institutional child abuse’ 
may include three primary, yet interrelated, categories: abuses within institutional 
child care;19 abuses by members of religious organisations;20 and the forced 
removal of children from their families following which many suffered abuse and 
																																																								
12 ESC Res 2002/12, UN ESCOR, 37th plen mtg, UN Doc E/Res/2002/12 (24 July 2002). 
13 Ibid cl 11. 
14 Ibid cl 12. 
15 Ibid cl 9. 
16 Ibid cls 13(a)–(c). 
17 Ibid cl 8. 
18 Ibid cl 13(a). 
19 Michael F Shaughnessy, ‘Institutional Child Abuse’ (1984) 6(4) Children and Youth Services 
Review 311; Bernard Gallagher, ‘The Extent and Nature of Known Cases of Institutional Child 
Sexual Abuse’ (2000) 30(4) British Journal of Social Work 795. 
20 Marie Keenan, Child Sexual Abuse and the Catholic Church: Gender, Power and Organizational 
Culture (Oxford University Press, 2011). See also, above n 2, n 4–6. 
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neglect while in institutional care.21 Although the focus in Northern Ireland has 
predominantly been on the first two, Australia has experienced all three forms of 
institutional child abuse and resultant inquiries related to these. The common focus 
of recent inquiries in both jurisdictions, and this article, however, is a combination 
of the first two — abuses of children within residential care in primarily religious 
contexts encompassing physical, as well as sexual, abuse. 
A range of well-rehearsed caveats underpin comparative legal scholarship, 
not least in terms of differences in legal frameworks and cultures, and 
socio-political ideologies.22 Mindful of the need to abide by the ‘rules of inference’ 
in social scientific inquiry,23 there are a number of reasons underlying our 
theoretical comparative approach and the choice of these particular case studies. 
First, the use of binary case studies is an established methodology in the area of 
comparative law,24 including criminology and criminal justice.25 In the vein of 
contemporary comparative law, this article adopts ‘an integrative approach’, rather 
than a purely contrastive one.26 That is, the emphasis is placed on highlighting the 
cross-cultural relevance and similarities between jurisdictional responses, rather 
than normative differences. Second, as academics living, working and researching 
in these respective jurisdictions, the ongoing high profile commissions or inquiries 
present a timely juncture at which to examine the broader utility of this method as 
a response to institutional child abuse. Third, both are Anglo-centric common law 
jurisdictions that have had a troubled and contested past and where post-colonial 
politics and issues such as territoriality and political and/or sectarian conflict may 
present additional considerations for redress.27 Beneath that macro-level politics, 
however, there are also emerging micro-level polities surrounding particular 
versions of victimhood related to historical institutional child abuse where inquiry 
‘narratives’ are used to confront ‘amnesia’ about a forgotten past and to 
‘re-imagine’ national identity.28 Fourth, at the pragmatic level, there is also a 
shared history of institutional child abuse. By way of example, many ‘child 
migrants’ were transported to Australia from Northern Ireland between the 
mid-1940s and mid-1950s as part of UK Government policy where they were later 
																																																								
21 Nagy and Kaur Sehdev, above n 8.  
22 Paul Roberts, ‘On Method: The Ascent of Comparative Criminal Justice’ (2002) 22(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 539; David Nelken, ‘Comparing Criminal Justice’ in Mike Maguire, Rod 
Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford University Press, 
4th ed, 2007) 139. 
23 Lee Epstein and Gary King, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 69(1) University of Chicago Law 
Review 1. 
24 See generally Ran Hirschl, ‘The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law’ 
(2005) 53(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 125.  
25 Dario Melossi, ‘The Cultural Embeddedness of Social Control: Reflections on the Comparison of Italian 
and North-American Cultures Concerning Punishment’ (2001) 5(4) Theoretical Criminology 403. 
26 Rudolf B Schlesinger, ‘Past and Future of Comparative Law’ (1995) 43(3) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 477. 
27 See, eg, Damien Short, Reconciliation and Colonial Power: Indigenous Rights in Australia 
(Ashgate, 2008); Jennifer Balint, Julie Evans and Nesam McMillan, ‘Rethinking Transitional 
Justice, Redressing Indigenous Harm: A New Conceptual Approach’ (2014) 8(2) International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 194. 
28 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso, 1983). 
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placed in institutions and abused.29 Some victims currently residing in Australia 
have given testimony to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry in Northern 
Ireland as former residents of child care institutions in the province and their 
testimonies will also be shared with the ongoing Royal Commission in Australia.30 
At the same time, however, while institutional child abuse has come to light 
as a contemporary societal problem in much the same way in both jurisdictions, 
there are also fundamentally different cultural lenses through which the issue has 
emerged. In brief, while Australia is a contemporary settled democracy, Northern 
Ireland is a paradigmatic transitional society seeking to countenance a history of 
armed conflict and serious political violence. Indeed, the legacy of the political and 
violent conflict in Northern Ireland undoubtedly makes the issues concerning child 
sexual abuse much more complex. Such cultural heterogeneity and the potential 
implications for both types of society seeking to move on from the legacy of 
institutional child abuse will be discussed further in the conclusion. 
C Paradigms and Structure 
This analysis draws upon several distinct literatures. A number of contemporary 
scholars have critically examined the case for restorative justice as applied to 
gendered and sexualised violence31 and with particular regard to clerical sexual 
abuse.32 Although the precise definition and parameters of ‘restorative justice’ 
remain highly contested, the term is generally applied to non-adversarial processes 
between victims and offenders that aim to ‘restore’ both parties through ‘mediated 
encounters’ leading to the acknowledgement of harm and reparation by the 
offender.33 The key agreed principles behind the paradigm include empowerment 
of all the parties affected by the offence (victim, offender and community); 
non-coercive participation and decision-making; and striking an appropriate 
balance between the multiple interests at stake.34 
																																																								
29 Henry McDonald, ‘Northern Irish Children Sent to Australia were Sexually Abused, Inquiry Told’, 
The Guardian (online), 1 September 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/sep/01/ 
northern-ireland-australian-orphanages-sexually-abused-inquiry>. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Barbara Hudson, ‘Restorative Justice and Gendered Violence: Diversion or Effective Justice?’ 
(2002) 42(3) British Journal of Criminology 616; McAlinden, above n 11; Bronwyn Naylor, 
‘Effective Justice for Victims of Sexual Assault: Taking Up the Debate on Alternative Pathways’ 
(2010) 33(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 662.  
32 Theo Gavrielides and Dale Coker, ‘Restoring Faith: Resolving the Catholic Church’s Sexual 
Scandals through Restorative Justice (Working Paper I)’ (2005) 8(4) Contemporary Justice Review 
345; Douglas E Noll and Linda Harvey, ‘Restorative Mediation: The Application of Restorative 
Justice Practice and Philosophy to Clergy Sexual Abuse Cases’ (2008) 17(3–4) Journal of Child 
Sexual Abuse 377. 
33 The extensive literature cannot be canvassed here, but see, eg, Daniel W Van Ness and Karen 
Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice (Anderson Publishing, 1997); Dennis Sullivan and Larry Tifft 
(eds), Handbook of Restorative Justice (Routledge, 2006); Howard Zehr, ‘Doing Justice, Healing 
Trauma: The Role of Restorative Justice in Peacebuilding’ (2008) 1(1) South Asian Journal of 
Peacebuilding 1. 
34 Adam Crawford, ‘Salient Themes Towards a Victim Perspective and the Limitations of Restorative 
Justice: Some Concluding Comments’ in Adam Crawford and Jo Goodey (eds), Integrating a 
Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice (Ashgate, 2000). 
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Others have examined the public inquiry method as a means of affecting 
deep-rooted institutional change more generally,35 as well as with specific regard 
to the aftermath of institutional clergy abuse.36 Such perspectives, however, have 
failed to consider how restorative narratives could fit within or relate to 
dominant legal paradigms, including public inquiries, as well as the prospects of 
the inquiry model in achieving justice and change for victims specifically. This 
article addresses these lacunas within the respective literatures. As Garland has 
contended, restorative justice has tended to operate at the margins of formal 
justice, particularly where serious forms of offending are concerned, ‘without 
much changing the overall balance of the system’.37 This article seeks to counter 
this tendency by critically examining the use of restorative justice within the 
public inquiry framework as a mainstream justice response in areas of high 
public controversy. A broader literature has questioned the utility and overuse of 
the public inquiry model as a ‘front-and-centre’ political response to 
contemporary social crises.38 This analysis also extends these debates by 
critically examining the merits of the public inquiry model as a response to 
historical institutional child abuse. 
Restorative justice is presented here as a means of countering what we 
regard as the failings of public inquiries as the principal legal framework for 
addressing institutional child abuse. As discussed further below, selectivity in the 
sampling of cases for public inquiry often results in a much narrower legal 
construction of victimhood. Furthermore, for those victims who do participate, 
such proceedings are often ‘characterised by formality, legality and a closed 
system of communication dominated by legal professionals’.39 The extrajudicial 
features of restorative approaches may serve to neutralise the psychological or 
emotional trauma of adversarial legal processes for victims.40 Restorative processes 
may also help to address what has been termed the ‘new dimension of 
victimization’41 relating to a distinctive range of psychological, emotional and 
other harms experienced by victims of clerical abuse in particular. 
What has been termed the ‘unique betrayal’ experienced by such victims 
relates to the religious or spiritual dimension of the offending stemming from a 
violation of faith, identity, human dignity and trust that State-controlled resolution 
																																																								
35 Steele, above n 10; Phil Scraton, ‘From Deceit to Disclosure: The Politics of Official Inquiries in 
the United Kingdom’ in George Gilligan and John Pratt (eds), Crime, Truth and Justice: Official 
Inquiry, Discourse, Knowledge (Willan Publishing, 2004) 46. 
36 Anne-Marie McAlinden, ‘An Inconvenient Truth: Barriers to Truth Recovery in the Aftermath of 
Institutional Child Abuse in Ireland’ (2013) 33(2) Legal Studies 189. 
37 David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 104.  
38 Sedley, above n 10; Steele, above n 10. 
39 Jonathan Doak and Louise Taylor, ‘Hearing the Voice of Victims and Offenders: The Role of 
Emotions in Criminal Sentencing’ (2013) 64(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 25, 45. 
40 Diana L Grimes, ‘Practice What You Preach: How Restorative Justice Could Solve the Judicial 
Problems in Clergy Sexual Abuse Cases’ (2006) 63(4) Washington and Lee Law Review 1693, 
1711–12. 
41 Theo Gavrielides, ‘Clergy Child Sexual Abuse and the Restorative Justice Dialogue’ (2013) 55(4) 
Journal of Church and State 617, 622–8. 
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processes are ill-equipped to address.42 This is not to minimise the impact of abuse 
on victims of child sexual abuse in a range of other intra-familial and quasi-intra 
familial settings, such as within family homes and schools, which are also typically 
predicated on implicit and unconditional trust. However, it is the ‘violation of 
meaning’ or ‘a sacred … worldview’43 and the breach of trust and power by 
perpetrators who represent both their God and their Church for victims within 
institutionalised religious settings that arguably extend the range of ‘harms’ and 
particularise the suffering of such victims. 
While acknowledging the fundamentally different justice paradigms 
employed by informal restorative processes and public inquiries as part of the 
apparatus of formal State justice,44 we argue that the public inquiry model may 
address some of the ‘account-making’ elements deemed necessary for the 
restoration or healing of victims (chiefly in terms of providing an authoritative 
record of events).45 It is more limited, however, in its capacity to deliver other 
forms of redress for victims including apology, forgiveness and procedural justice. 
A key element of restoration is securing ‘procedural justice’ for both victims and 
offenders, where there is focus on building trust and legitimacy in the fairness of 
the process46 and in securing therapeutic benefits for victims. 
The structure of the article is as follows: Part II briefly examines what is 
meant by ‘justice’ for victims and what victims of institutional child abuse want 
from justice processes. Part III provides a critical overview of public inquiries as a 
response to institutional child abuse, including those in Northern Ireland and 
Australia. Part IV examines key elements of the restorative paradigm and its use 
with clerical sexual abuse. Part V considers the opportunities, challenges and 
limitations of combining these justice paradigms. Finally, the article concludes by 
evaluating the implications for restorative justice discourses more broadly in 
seeking to address large-scale abuses, as well as the lessons for other jurisdictions 
seeking to come to terms with the legacy of institutional child abuse. 
II ‘Justice’ for Victims of Institutional Child Abuse 
A useful starting point is to examine what is meant by ‘justice’ more broadly for 
victims of institutional child abuse. In this respect, several scholars have examined 
what victims of sexual assault in general want from the justice system. Many 
victims want public denunciation of the harm suffered and punishment for the 
																																																								
42 Joseph J Guido, ‘A Unique Betrayal: Clergy Sexual Abuse in the Context of the Catholic Religious 
Tradition’ (2008) 17(3–4) Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 255. 
43 Ibid 255. See also Kenneth I Pargament, Nichole A Murray-Swank and Annette Mahoney, 
‘Problem and Solution: The Spiritual Dimension of Clergy Sexual Abuse and Its Impact on 
Survivors’ (2008) 17(3–4) Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 397. 
44 Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Herald Press, 1990). 
45 Natalia Josephine Blecher, ‘Sorry Justice: Apology in Australian Family Group Conferencing’ (2011) 
18(1) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 95; Jonathan Doak, ‘Honing the Stone: Refining Restorative 
Justice as a Vehicle for Emotional Redress’ (2011) 14(4) Contemporary Justice Review 439. 
46 Tom R Tyler et al, ‘Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidivism: The Engagement 
of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment’ 
(2007) 41(3) Law & Society Review 553. 
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offender.47 Other victims, however, seek a broader range of outcomes than can be 
provided by conventional justice processes including public acknowledgement of 
the harm they have suffered, by both the offender and the community;48 a genuine 
voice and some control over the process;49 mechanisms of genuine 
accountability,50 including an apology from the perpetrator and compensation or 
reparation;51 preventing the recurrence of the abuse;52 and forgiveness and 
reconciliation with offenders.53 
Other studies have also explored what victims of clerical sexual abuse 
specifically want from justice processes.54 Victims of such crimes seek, among 
other things, full disclosure; face-to-face encounters with church authorities to hear 
them take responsibility for wrongdoing; offender remorse and accountability; 
offender appreciation of the impact of the abuse on their lives; victim 
empowerment and a role in the justice process; rebalancing of power; an 
independent investigation of the facts; validation of their suffering, and support by 
the State and the Church; and stopping the abuse by the individual and by the 
institution for current and future victims. Given the diversity in what victims want 
in terms of justice, there is arguably a need for greater flexibility within justice 
responses. While a restorative process cannot guarantee victims of mass crimes the 
full range of options they might seek, its incorporation might go some way towards 
ensuring that victims of institutional child abuse perceive the inquiry proceedings 
as fair. It is our contention that some of these outcomes are achievable within an 
appropriately modified inquiry framework that incorporates restorative elements, 
although the potential for others is less certain and more limited. 
‘Procedural justice’ is generally taken to refer to the procedures and 
decisions that help shape and inform an outcome, and the impact that this has on 
how fairly participants feel they have been treated and whether their needs have 
been meet.55 Procedural justice for victims of institutional child abuse has been 
presented as a potential means of incorporating a number of core benefits for 
victims. Daly, for example, in her recent work on institutional child abuse in 
Australia and Canada,56 drawing on the work of Tyler,57 identifies ‘justice’ for 
																																																								
47 Hudson, above n 31; Martin Wright, ‘The Court as Last Resort’ (2002) 42(3) British Journal of 
Criminology 654. 
48 J L Herman, ‘Justice from the Victim’s Perspective’ (2005) 11(5) Violence Against Women 571. 
49 Denise Lievore, ‘No Longer Silent: A Study of Women’s Help-Seeking Decisions and Service 
Responses to Sexual Assault’ (Report, Australian Institute of Criminology, June 2005). 
50 Marie Keenan, ‘Sexual Trauma and Abuse: Restorative and Transformative Possibilities?’ (Report, 
School of Applied Social Sciences, University College Dublin, 27 November 2014) ch 5. 
51 Naylor, above n 31. 
52 Bruce Feldthusen, Olena Hankivsky and Lorraine Greaves, ‘Therapeutic Consequences of Civil 
Actions for Damages and Compensation Claims by Victims of Sexual Abuse’ (2000) 12(1) 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 66. 
53 Heather Strang and John Braithwaite (eds), Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (Ashgate, 2000). 
54 See, eg, Jennifer M Balboni and Donna M Bishop, ‘Transformative Justice: Survivor Perspectives 
on Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation’ (2010) 13(2) Contemporary Justice Review 133. 
55 See, eg, E Allan Lind and Tom R Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Plenum 
Press, 1988).  
56 Kathleen Daly, Redressing Institutional Abuse of Children (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
57 Lind and Tyler, above n 55; Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press, 1990). 
2016] PUBLIC INQUIRIES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHILD ABUSE 285 
such victims as containing ‘elements of procedural justice’.58 She proposes a set of 
five ‘justice interests’: ‘participation, voice, validation, vindication, and offender 
accountability’.59 Procedural justice has merit in not only assisting victims in 
pursuing these legitimate interests within formal legal processes,60 but as a means 
of alleviating secondary victimisation61 and affirming victims’ voices and dignity 
in the proceedings.62 Previous research has identified procedural justice as the 
optimal mode of redress for victims of institutional abuse. However, it has stopped 
short of examining questions of praxis, and the normative and conceptual 
implications of how such a model would fit within the public inquiry process as the 
dominant legal paradigm, as this article seeks to do. 
There is a dearth of research on victims of institutional child abuse, but 
further empirical support for the need to question current orthodoxies and think 
more creatively in addressing the needs of victims for procedural justice outside 
legalistic variants of justice comes from a number of recent studies conducted 
with victims of sexual crime in the Republic of Ireland and Australia. In the 
Republic of Ireland, where there has been a recent history of public inquiries into 
clerical sexual abuse, research has highlighted ‘significant gaps in current justice 
provision’ and ‘the need for additional justice mechanisms for victims of sexual 
crime’ and the attendant ‘transformative possibilities’ of restorative justice.63  
In particular, victims of sexual trauma, including victims of clerical abuse, voiced 
the need to come face-to-face with their perpetrators in order, to put questions to 
them and gain greater understanding about why the abuse happened, and to 
facilitate ‘healing’ and genuine offender accountability.64 Similarly, in the 
Australian context, recent doctoral research by Courtin has established that 
victims of Catholic clergy sexual abuse want: acknowledgement of the victim’s 
truth; the Church hierarchy to tell the truth about what it knew and how it 
responded; accountability of the Church hierarchy, especially for concealing the 
crimes; monetary compensation; criminal accountability of the perpetrator; an 
effective apology; counselling and other services; and, finally, prevention of 
further clergy abuse.65 
As noted above, it is important to acknowledge, however, the fundamentally 
different ideologies and goals of public inquiries, as an instrument of formal 
justice, and more informal restorative processes as a means of responding to 
disputes and addressing blame.66 As Hoyle and Young contend, there are 
																																																								
58 Daly, above n 56, 117–18. 
59 Ibid 117. 
60 Lind and Tyler, above n 55. 
61 See, eg, Jim Parsons and Tiffany Bergin, ‘The Impact of Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ 
Mental Health’ (2010) 23(2) Journal of Traumatic Stress 182. 
62 See also Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,  
GA Res 40/34, UN GAOR, 40th sess, 96th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/40/34 (29 November 1985) 
annex art 6(b). 
63 Keenan, above n 50, 4. 
64 Ibid ch 5. 
65 Judith Edwina Courtin, Sexual Assault and the Catholic Church: Are Victims Finding Justice? 
(PhD Thesis, Monash University, 2015) ch 3. 
66 Randy E Barnett, ‘Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice’ in Gerry Johnstone (ed),  
A Restorative Justice Reader: Texts, Sources, Context (Willan Publishing, 2003) 46; Zehr, above n 44. 
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‘undeniably tensions created by attempts to graft restorative justice on to 
established systems of … justice’.67 In essence, while the focus of public inquiries 
is on adjudication and establishing fault or responsibility for particular acts or 
omissions, restorative justice as a process is not about fact-finding for the 
determination of guilt, but rather reparation in the aftermath of harm and devising 
an appropriate response to admitted behaviour.68 Mindful of such tensions and 
challenges, our analysis will also seek to draw out the shared goals of public 
inquiries and restorative programmes, principally in terms of victim catharsis and 
offender accountability. 
III Public Inquiries as a Response to Institutional Child 
Abuse 
The emergence of institutional child abuse as a contemporary societal problem 
came about in much the same way in Northern Ireland and Australia — via an 
incremental process of individual cases, media scrutiny and an ensuing public 
outcry. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the main inquiries in 
Northern Ireland and Australia followed by a critical examination of the limitations 
of public inquiries as a response to institutional child abuse and in addressing the 
needs of victims in particular. 
A Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
The emerging crisis of historical institutional child abuse in Northern Ireland has 
been preceded, and to a certain extent precipitated by, a chain of recent 
high-profile inquiries into the handling of institutional child abuse in the 
neighbouring Republic of Ireland.69 Bertie Ahern, the then Taoiseach,70 issued the 
first public political apology to victims of institutional child abuse on behalf of the 
Irish State in May 1999. The most high profile of the inquiries, the Commission to 
Inquire into Child Abuse (the ‘Ryan Commission’), was established soon after to 
investigate the treatment of children in residential institutions run by Catholic 
religious orders dating back to 1936.71 The Residential Institutions Redress Board 
was also set up as a compensation scheme for victims of institutional abuse.72 The 
Ryan Commission had two key components: an ‘Investigation Committee’ that 
																																																								
67 Carolyn Hoyle and Richard Young, ‘Restorative Justice: Assessing the Prospects and Pitfalls’ in 
Mike McConville and Geoffrey Wilson (eds), The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process 
(Oxford University Press, 2002) 525, 546.  
68 Ibid 525. 
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2005); Commission of Investigation into the Catholic Archdiocese of Dublin, Report (2009); 
Commission of Investigation into the Catholic Diocese of Cloyne, Report (2011); 
Inter-Departmental Committee to Establish the Facts of State Involvement with the Magdalen 
Laundries, Government of Ireland, Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee to Establish the 
Facts of State Involvement with the Magdalen Laundries (2013). There is also an ongoing 
Commission of Investigation into Mother and Baby Homes. 
70 The Head of Government or Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland. 
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heard the personal testimonies of those who had been abused in public hearings, 
and a ‘Confidential Committee’ that allowed for the giving of such evidence in 
private. Its five-volume report, which took nine years to produce, highlighted the 
fact that the abuse of children (physical, sexual, emotional and neglect), and the 
failure of Church and State authorities to adequately respond to the problem, was 
systemic in Irish child care institutions.73 
In the aftermath of the Ryan Commission Report, however, criticisms began 
to emerge and many victims were left wanting in terms of ‘justice’.74 In particular, 
the aspirations of providing an authoritative record of events and holding 
perpetrators to account had not been realised. It has been argued, for example, that 
the legal architecture of such inquiries, including the exigencies of the Church–
State relationship in Ireland, is not conducive to ‘truth recovery’ or the search for 
justice in the public accounting of the past.75 There were a number of institutional 
and structural factors that limited the extent to which such an inquiry could deliver 
justice and be truly cognisant of the needs of victims. These can be distilled to two 
main lines of critique that relate broadly to victim and offender participation. 
First, selectivity in the sampling of cases meant that the Commission 
reported not on all allegations of abuse, but only on institutions with the largest 
number of complaints. Focusing on a limited number of exemplary cases tends to 
individualise narratives of victimhood and obscure broader patterns of 
victimisation. A narrow legal construction of victimhood and focus on selected 
testimonies also tends to create ‘hierarchies of pain’76 by excluding particular 
accounts of victimhood and subordinating the experiences of some victims.77 
Moreover, the singular focus on the direct victims of institutional abuse also fails 
to acknowledge secondary and tertiary victims, including the families of victims, 
as well as the wider faith community. Second, there were a number of legal 
challenges to the existence of the Commission by religious orders, as a result of 
which many abusers were not named publicly, but were dealt with anonymously.78 
The failure to publicly identify abusers, due to pending prosecutions in some cases, 
was a particular concern of victims, many of whom expressed their frustration that 
those responsible were being protected, while their harm and suffering was not 
fully acknowledged.79 As a judge-led model with a statutory remit, the Ryan 
Commission model, however, continues to be highly influential on the 
governments of other jurisdictions, including Northern Ireland and Australia, and 
on victims in particular, in conceiving of an ideological and legal framework to 
deal with historic institutional child abuse. 
																																																								
73 Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, above n 6, vol 4 [6.09]–[6.18]. 
74 Anecdotal conversations between one of the authors and lawyers and victims’ groups (2010–12). See 
also Bruce Arnold, The Irish Gulag: How the State Betrayed Its Innocent Children (Gill & Macmillan, 
2009) 249–56; Tony Flannery (ed), Responding to the Ryan Report (Columba Press, 2009). 
75 McAlinden, above n 36. 
76 Daly, above n 56, 179–80. 
77 See, eg, in the context of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Brandon 
Hamber and Richard A Wilson, ‘Symbolic Closure through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in 
Post-Conflict Societies’ (2002) 1(1) Journal of Human Rights 35. 
78 See Michael Murray v Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse [2003] High Court of Ireland 2003 
1998P (17 October 2003) (Abbott J). 
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In Northern Ireland, perhaps the most high profile case to date is the 
‘Kincora scandal’, which involved the systematic abuse of boys through vice rings 
and prostitution in Kincora hostel in East Belfast over several decades.80 The case 
is being reopened following the establishment of the Historical Institutional Abuse 
Inquiry. In the aftermath of the publication of the Ryan Commission Report in 
May 2009, survivors of historical institutional child abuse in Northern Ireland 
began campaigning for an independent judge-led inquiry. Following a one-year 
extension, this ongoing inquiry will take place over the course of three-and-a-half 
years (reporting in January 2017) and is being led by Sir Anthony Hart, a retired 
High Court judge. The terms of reference of the inquiry — which encompasses, 
but is not limited to, religious institutions — include an examination of whether 
there were systemic failings by institutions or the State in their duties towards 
children in their care between 1922 and 1995.81 
In adopting a similar format to the Ryan Commission, the inquiry has two 
main components: the ‘Acknowledgement Forum’, which will listen to the 
experiences of those who were children in residential institutions; and the 
‘Investigative Panel’, which will investigate the way in which children were 
treated in such institutions during those dates. Criticisms have emerged as to the 
narrow scope of the inquiry and lack of adequate support and redress mechanisms 
for victims.82 As Lawry-White has argued more broadly, citing Herman, ‘although 
the truth seeking process can have a healing effect’, there is a danger that for some 
victims, testifying to a truth commission, in the words of Herman, ‘“opens them up 
and leaves them with nowhere to go”’.83 These arguments underscore the need for 
broader and longer term assistance for victims, beyond the lifetime of the inquiry 
process that better meets the nuances and complexities of victim experience. 
B Australia 
In Australia, there has been a proliferation of public inquiries into institutional 
child abuse centred on three intersecting themes: abuses in institutional care, 
abuses by members of religious orders, and the forced removal of children from 
their families.84 An ongoing issue at the federal level has been the recognition of 
the harm done by government policy under which Indigenous children were 
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removed from their parents and placed with white families or in institutions, 
producing what has been called ‘the Stolen Generation’. A 1997 national inquiry 
called for an apology, and for compensation for victims.85 After a change of 
government, a public statement of apology was made by the newly elected Labor 
Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, on 13 February 2008, a moment regarded by many as 
pivotal in Australia’s history.86 
A second strand of federal senate inquiries, and a second formal apology,87 
arose from two waves of removal of children into institutional care. One was the 
forced migration of abandoned or destitute British ‘child migrants’ to the colonies, 
beginning in the early 20th century, many of whom were brought to remote 
institutions in Australia as cheap labour, and suffered abuse and neglect.88 The 
other was the placing of significant numbers of Australian children in institutional 
care for a variety of reasons including being orphaned, social hardship and forced 
removal from their mothers primarily because the mothers were unmarried.89 
Beyond these national postcolonial narratives of victimhood, however,  
a further wave of accounts about the past have emerged in parallel at State level in 
relation to the abuse of children in institutional, particularly church-based, 
settings.90 One of the most notable of these inquiries was the ‘Forde 
Commission’,91 established by the Queensland Government in 1998, whose 
recommendations were followed up in 2012.92 More recently, in April 2012 the 
Victorian Government established a cross-party parliamentary Inquiry into the 
Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Organisations. While victim 
groups were delighted at the official recognition of their claims, there were public 
criticisms of the chosen mode of response. In particular, the Parliamentary 
Committee had a small number of members, none expert in the area, and was given 
a short timeline for reporting. The terms of reference were broad, covering 
‘religious and other non-government organisations’, and required a report on a 
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range of issues including whether there were ‘systemic practices’ in the 
organisations that prevented or discouraged reporting of abuse and any changes to 
law or practices to prevent future criminal abuse.93 The Committee held its last 
public hearing on 27 May 2013 and the report of the inquiry was published in 
November 2013.94 While the report made a number of recommendations including 
alternative pathways for redress, primarily in the form of a compensatory scheme 
and independent redress to replace the Catholic Church’s internal systems, these 
were not situated within a restorative framework. 
Finally, in December 2012 the then Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, 
announced the establishment of a national Royal Commission into Institutional 
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse to investigate sexual abuse in a range of 
institutions including, but not limited to, the Catholic Church.95 The six-member 
Royal Commission is headed by a judge, the Hon Justice Peter McClennan. The 
wide terms of reference,96 and the resulting volume of cases,97 have meant that the 
reporting date has recently been extended from December 2015 to December 2017, 
with an estimated total cost of over A$500 million.98 The inquiry, established 
under the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), has extensive powers of 
investigation. Similar in constitution to the Ryan Commission in the Republic of 
Ireland, provision is made for making a submission in a recorded private meeting 
with one Commissioner, not on oath, as well as for sworn evidence by selected 
participants at public hearings. By its terms of reference, the Commission is to 
provide people ‘directly or indirectly affected’ with opportunities to share their 
experiences, to focus on systemic issues in recommendations, and to make 
appropriate referrals (eg for prosecution) in individual cases.99 
At the time of writing, with the inquiries in both jurisdictions ongoing it 
remains to be seen what their respective outcomes will be. The lessons already 
emerging, however, from these and previous inquiries are clear in terms of their 
potential limitations in meeting the needs of victims. Unlike the Northern Ireland 
Inquiry, which is limited in its terms of reference to investigating whether there 
were institutional failings,100 the Australian Royal Commission is able to refer 
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individual cases for prosecution.101 However, while public accounting of the 
crimes may be providing acknowledgement and vindication for many victims, it is 
our contention that the legalistic and formal constraints on such processes mean 
that they risk falling short in providing ‘justice’ for individual victims and 
accountability for perpetrators. 
C The Value and Limitations of Public Inquiries 
Public inquiries can take several forms, from the grandiose ‘Royal’ Commission or 
commission of inquiry to the departmental committee. A feature of common law 
jurisdictions, public inquiries represent a State-sponsored, independent and 
typically judicially chaired review of events, usually focused on a specific 
controversial occurrence, and so occur on an ad hoc basis.102 Public inquiries, as an 
‘instrument of government’103 serve an important symbolic function. They have 
been a chosen strategy in many jurisdictions to address a range of State — or 
State-supported — harms, chiefly because of their organisational and ‘curative 
properties’104 as a form of scandal management.105 
At a broader level, within the United Kingdom (‘UK’) in particular, high 
profile tribunals of inquiry have been the vanguard of justice responses to a 
spectrum of public controversies since the 1990s. These have included, for 
example, those relating to the ‘conflict’ in Northern Ireland,106 cases of serial 
murder,107 child care and protection,108 national tragedies,109 medical negligence 
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and public health,110 as well as institutional child abuse.111 Indeed, public inquiries 
have a number of important societal benefits. Most notably, these include: public 
adjudication on allegations of systemic wrongdoing; providing victim access to 
other avenues to justice such as criminal prosecution or compensation schemes; 
and acting as a vehicle for law reform. As Delacorn has noted (writing in the 
Australian context), public inquiries that potentially highlight not only the 
commission of abuse, but also the collective denials, collusions and failures of 
State and quasi-State agencies, also have the capacity to re-establish public trust 
via the promotion of institutional accountability.112 
One of the fundamental limitations of public inquiries, however, is the fact 
that they have paradoxical aims and potentially competing functions — they 
encompass both an inquisitorial and an adversarial component; and have elements 
of truth-telling, as well as apportioning blame with possible criminal sanctions. It 
is these fundamental tensions that lie at the heart of why organisations and 
individual offenders may not cooperate fully with inquiry processes. Consequently, 
they also help to explain why inquiries may fully serve neither victims’ interests in 
terms of justice, nor the due process rights of offenders. In particular, public 
inquiries, as a response to the needs of victims, have inherent structural limitations 
that have been little considered. As discussed below, while public inquiries may 
deliver some elements deemed necessary for the validation of victims’ interests 
and the restoration of dignity, namely in terms of providing an official account of 
events, they are more limited in their potential to deliver other forms of procedural 
justice that victims want such as giving ‘voice’ to victims and ensuring genuine 
offender accountability. 
Writing in the aftermath of the Scott Inquiry113 into the illegal export of 
arms to Iraq, Lord Howe suggested that a public inquiry has six distinct aims:  
(i) establishing the facts;  
(ii) learning from the past;  
(iii) catharsis or therapeutic exposure for ‘stakeholders’; 
(iv) public reassurance; 
(v) making individuals and organisations accountable; and 
(vi) wider political considerations.114 
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These aims map broadly on to the goals of public inquiries identified by Steele as 
those of ‘scandal control, blame attribution and lesson-learning’.115 Justice 
processes designed by elites, however, ‘always run the risk of instrumentalizing 
victims or local communities’,116 in order to spearhead a reform agenda.  
As outlined above, there may be a sizeable gap between the rhetoric of public 
inquiries and the reality of practice on the ground. In particular, the myriad 
politically orientated aims of public inquiries may obfuscate any real victim focus. 
In this respect, it is the third and fifth of Lord Howe’s aims (catharsis and 
accountability) that are of central importance in establishing victim-centred 
discourses on institutional child abuse. Distilling Lord Howe’s list further, and 
drawing on the work of Popkin and Roht-Arriaza in the related context of 
investigatory commissions,117 a public inquiry can potentially achieve at least four 
aims that traditional legal avenues (such as civil or criminal proceedings) cannot. 
It can provide an authoritative account of what happened; it can give victims a 
forum to tell their story; it can recommend policy changes to prevent future 
recurrences of the harm; and it can identify offenders and make them publicly 
accountable. However, as Harlow has contended, these expectations of public 
inquiries or truth commissions can also be highly contradictory because 
establishing facts may ultimately undermine accountability and a forward-looking 
focus may diminish accountability for past wrongs.118 Moreover, a collective 
discourse that emphasises organisational accountability may provide little catharsis 
for individual victims.119 
The purported aim of inquiry frameworks is often inquisitorial in nature, 
with support services being made available for victims and witnesses. Inevitably, 
however, a highly adversarial framework is often the norm within the 
investigatory, fact-finding component where ‘all the classical strategies of 
cross-examination are used to discredit their [complainants’] accounts’.120 Having 
completed the acknowledgement forum stage, which occurred in a private setting, 
the inquiry process in Northern Ireland has more recently focused on ongoing 
public hearings that began in January 2014 and bring with them the full legal 
apparatus of the adversarial system. Meanwhile, in Australia, the Royal 
Commission has held public hearings and private sessions concurrently. It is the 
procedural format of the investigatory or public component in particular that is 
typically steeped in technocratic concerns and is virtually ‘indistinguishable from 
the forensic tenor of court proceedings’.121 Indeed, the peculiar constitutional 
apparatus of the public inquiry constitutes ‘a hybrid legal-and-administrative 
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process’.122 It is this synthesis of juridical procedure with broader collective State 
interests that arguably undermines its viability and usefulness for individual 
victims as a form of redress. 
Specifically, the inherent structural and administrative limitations of public 
inquiries, which typically operate within narrow terms of reference focused on 
making recommendations for law reform, may impede the deeper systemic 
exploration of the context, causes, and consequences of abuse that may be 
necessary in seeking a just process and outcomes for victims. Scholars have 
espoused several factors as being central to ‘healing for victims’ — 
account-making (providing an authoritative account and identifying those 
accountable), apology, forgiveness and procedural justice.123 While the public 
inquiry model may address some of the elements deemed necessary for the healing 
of victims (chiefly in terms of providing an authoritative record of events, 
disclosure of abuse, and accountability of offenders or institutions however 
narrowly this is construed), it is more limited in the extent to which it can achieve 
other forms of redress including apology, forgiveness and procedural justice. 
Tyler has elaborated on five elements that underpin procedural justice: 
impartiality, ethicality, lack of bias, correctability and control.124 We argue that the 
first three of these may be achievable within the inquiry rubric, in terms of the 
impartial, independent review of events. However, in relation to correctability and 
control, the rather narrow and linear focus on institutional accountability and the 
wider systemic issues in making recommendations for reform may result in missed 
opportunities to promote individual offender accountability for acts or omissions in 
particular cases, as highlighted above in relation to criticisms of the Ryan 
Commission. Similarly, the public inquiry as a State-controlled process with a 
restricted legal and administrative remit leaves little room for consideration of 
victim participation or control over the process. 
The rules that govern how an inquiry conducts itself (eg the evidential rules 
governing the privilege against self-incrimination, the attendance of witnesses, and 
disclosure and the production of documents)125 are fundamental — not just to what 
Tyler would describe as the procedural fairness of an inquiry,126 but also more 
broadly to the extent to which it is viewed as legitimate by victims. The ‘spectacle 
of legality’,127 and the deployment of legal ‘theatre’ and judges in particular, in 
issues of high social or political controversy, lends ‘a seal of credibility’128 and 
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respectability to the proceedings. What Bourdieu terms ‘the force of law’129 as an 
organising principle, however, serves to reinforce the formal, adversarial, 
regulatory agenda underpinning inquiry processes and, as such, leaves little room 
for addressing the affective needs of victims, and the incorporation of broader 
informal, restorative principles. The incorporation of those principles includes the 
possibility of referral to a diversionary restorative process that promotes a level of 
direct engagement and the rebalancing of power between victims and offenders 
and, with it, the empowerment of victims, full disclosure of wrongdoing, and 
genuine remorse and accountability on the part of offenders. In the next part of this 
article, we argue that formal incorporation of some of the ideals of restorative 
justice into the public inquiry model may make it more useful for victims in future. 
IV Restorative Responses to Institutional Child Abuse 
A The Restorative Paradigm 
Some scholars have characterised the restorative justice vision as a paradigm shift 
in criminal law.130 Others, however, highlight the compatibility of informal 
restorative principles and formal State justice as alternative forms of justice.131 For 
the latter scholars, these two frameworks may, in fact, be integrated as part of the 
same system of justice where they would complement and work in tandem with 
each other. Restorative justice may, indeed, serve many of the formal functions of 
law such as denunciation, rehabilitation/reintegration, individual and public 
protection — and achieve a better balance between these aims than formal criminal 
justice does.132 
Restorative justice approaches to institutional child abuse, however, are 
only in their infancy. Several jurisdictions have put in place user-led restorative 
processes for survivors and perpetrators of clerical abuse, which generally take 
place outside of traditional justice processes. Ad hoc schemes have developed in a 
number of jurisdictions — including Canada, the US and Belgium — employing 
primarily mediation-based practices.133 In the Netherlands, for example, in the 
aftermath of the Deetman Commission,134 a tripartite approach comprised of 
mediation, a settlement agreement and an award of compensation has been 
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established.135 Such schemes, however, may remain overtly adversarial for victims, 
due largely to the presence of legal representatives.136 In other jurisdictions such as 
Australia and the Republic of Ireland, churches have set up internal processes to 
hear the claims of survivors of institutional child abuse, and to address counselling 
and compensation, but these are not clearly framed within a ‘restorative’ 
paradigm.137 Indeed, taken as a whole, organised restorative responses to clerical 
abuse operate on an ad hoc basis and are ‘extremely limited’138 and highly 
problematic in addressing the claims of victims. Moreover, empirical evidence and 
evaluations are scant or non-existent.139 
Critics of restorative justice have generally underlined the dangers inherent 
in a communitarian approach to justice, principally regarding the need to ensure 
legitimacy,140 accountability141 and adequate safeguards.142 While neo-Marxist 
scholars have pinpointed the role of the State within restorative processes as the 
chief area of concern,143 feminist writers have traditionally highlighted the 
unsuitability of restorative justice in the domain of gendered and sexualised 
violence primarily underlining the need to hold offenders formally accountable and 
the risk of perpetuation of power imbalances between victims and offenders.144 
More recently, there has been increased feminist engagement with informal 
justice145 and a growing recognition that the restorative paradigm may have a role 
to play in dealing with intimate violence and abuse.146 The suitability of restorative 
justice with high level forms of offending such as sexual abuse, however, remains 
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controversial,147 particularly among adult survivors of historical child sexual 
abuse.148 The core concerns of critics, particularly those related to the proper role 
of the State and the right to legal representation, and fears about power imbalances 
and repeat victimisation in offender-centred processes, are addressed below. 
While the breadth of the theory and practice of restorative justice is 
discussed extensively in the literature,149 we are only concerned here with drawing 
out some of the key themes that are of direct relevance to the issue of procedural 
justice for victims of institutional child abuse. In tandem with the core ingredients 
of procedural justice outlined above, three key themes of restorative justice are 
explored here:150 giving victims a voice or an element of control over the process; 
correctability in terms of promoting organisational and individual offender 
accountability; and achieving what Gavrielides and Coker claim is central to a 
restorative process for victims –— namely, a culture of ‘open dialogue and 
constructive shaming’.151 
The first two of these intrinsic objectives (namely victim participation, and 
perpetrator accountability) chime with the core objectives of public inquiries as 
outlined above. Restorative justice, however, offers a broader perspective of victim 
empowerment and offender accountability which may improve the capacity of 
public inquiries to play a more constructive role in responding to institutional child 
abuse. In the sections that follow, we look first at the scope for voice and 
accountability in the public inquiry, and then at ‘open dialogue and constructive 
shaming’152 and other aspects of restorative justice that may be more difficult to 
achieve within a public inquiry setting. 
B Giving ‘Voice’ to Victims 
Some of the core concerns of critics of restorative justice about exacerbating power 
imbalances and encouraging repeat victimisation,153 are largely mitigated by the 
emphasis on victim empowerment and active participation, which are regarded as 
key components of restorative processes. Noll and Harvey, for example, outline 
three core rules that underpin successful restorative justice practices with clergy 
sexual abuse cases and are directly related to the discursive nature of the process 
— namely, that the parties are able to: 	  
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(i) meet and discuss their experiences of the wrong;  
(ii) discuss and agree how to make things as right as possible between 
them; and 
(iii) discuss and agree how future safety might be achieved.154 
 
With the emphasis on inclusivity and active decision-making, the incorporation of 
a restorative component within the inquiry process may provide a more inclusive 
forum for victim narratives to be told. In contrast to the conventional constraints of 
public inquiry processes, which often limit participation to certain classes of 
victim, restorative justice makes the victim’s perspective central to the 
proceedings. As Hudson put it, the victim can ‘put her claims in her own terms’ 
and not ‘have to accommodate to the dominant modes of legal/political 
discourse’.155 
Giving victims a voice and an active role in the justice process helps to 
challenge the abuse of power which lies at the heart of abusive relationships. 
Affording a wider range of victims of institutional child abuse the opportunity to 
‘tell their story’, has important cathartic benefits and is perhaps the single most 
important value of a victim-focused public inquiry process that aims to incorporate 
a restorative response to such offences. The age difference between child victims 
and adult offenders in cases of child sexual abuse also raises crucial power 
differentials.156 Moreover, cases of historical child abuse may entail an additional, 
more complex power dimension in that the victim as an adult is facing a 
perpetrator who abused them as a child. This also underscores the need to adopt a 
similar approach to that taken in the resolution of cases of family violence157 where 
appropriate mechanisms are put in place to support victim decision-making 
throughout the process. Such models have been used in New Zealand, Canada and 
the US and adopt a family decision-making model that brings together family 
members, and other close supports to address areas of concern.158 
Although the understanding of victims’ experiences of restorative justice is 
currently both underdeveloped and contested, there is an accepted need for a more 
fully rounded and nuanced conception of what Pemberton terms ‘psycho-social 
assistance’ for victims159 — that is, support, assistance and therapeutic encounters 
for individual victims divorced from prevailing law and justice discourses. 
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Similarly, what Doak has referred to as the ‘therapeutic dimension’160 of 
transitional or restorative processes may incorporate, among other things, 
account-making, ‘justice’ and ‘deliberative encounter’.161 The latter, in particular, 
speaks to the psychological and emotional benefits to victims of having an 
organised face-to-face conference with offenders. Within the current inquiry 
frameworks in Northern Ireland and Australia, as set out above, victims as a 
category of inquiry witness have the opportunity to construct a narrative in their 
own words and give a personal account of their experiences either in private or 
public sessions. As noted above and discussed further below, however, there are 
inherent difficulties in the further step of facilitating an open, face-to-face 
encounter between victims and individual perpetrators or institutional leaders as 
part of a two-way process of ‘constructive shaming’. 
C Offender Accountability 
Rather than minimising serious criminal behaviour as critics claim,162 restorative 
justice aims to directly engage offenders to help them appreciate the impact of their 
actions on victims and significant others and ensure accountability for their 
actions. Beyond the ‘norm-affirming expressive role of adversarial criminal 
justice’, restorative processes may play ‘an additional, norm-creating role’.163 This 
may be especially important in the context of historical institutional child abuse, in 
challenging prevailing cultural attitudes protective of the Church or the State, 
which public inquiries with a narrow statutory remit are ill-equipped to address. 
Engaging victims in face-to-face encounters with Church or State authorities to 
hear them take responsibility for wrongdoing can also have a powerful therapeutic 
effect on victims.164 Equally, offender remorse and empathy for victims (typically 
in the form of an ‘apology’ or an acknowledgement of harm from the offender or 
the Church) have greater potential to achieve offender restoration than the 
stigmatisation inherent in investigatory processes.165 As noted above, victims have 
a broader range of interests than punishment of the offender. Indeed, in terms of 
accountability, apologies are often regarded by restorative justice practitioners and 
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by victims in particular as much more important than retribution or material 
reparation such as compensation.166 Recent research, for example, with victims of 
institutional abuse in the Republic of Ireland has demonstrated that an ‘apology’ is 
foremost in what victims want as a form of restorative redress.167 
A potential latent problem, of course, concerns the genuineness and 
legitimacy of the ‘apology’ as an expression of offender remorse and 
accountability.168 The overuse and insincerity of apologies, particularly by public 
figures, may serve to cheapen or belittle justice.169 To be perceived as conveying 
true ‘sorriness’, a ‘functional apology’170 needs to have a focus not just on the self 
(recognition of what the offender has done), but on the other who has been harmed 
(empathetic acknowledgement of the harm as experienced by the victim, and 
willingness to repair the harm). An abject apology should be a response by the 
person who has harmed showing that they acknowledge the harm they caused and 
should be given without expecting anything in return (such as acceptance of the 
apology or forgiveness).171 This may be especially problematic when it comes to 
large institutions such as the State or the Catholic Church where there is likely to be 
a performative aspect to apologies. Language is known to have a pivotal role in the 
aftermath of trauma.172 The politics and syntax of apology — who says ‘sorry’ and 
for what (that is individual offenders or the institutions themselves) — may also 
have a determining role in the legitimacy and acceptance of apology for victims. 
Indeed, apology, as a prelude to healing, and as the touchstone of restorative 
justice, is an extremely complex, variable, and fragile gesture.173 In the case of 
clerical sexual abuse, the issues are manifestly more complex because of the dual 
complicity of both Church and State in sustaining the abuse in some instances as 
happened in the Republic of Ireland174 and, to a lesser extent, Australia. In relation 
to the State, as outlined above, the setting up the inquiry process is typically 
accompanied by an expression of regret and a public apology to victims on behalf 
of the State, albeit the sincerity of the apology may be questioned by the public.175 
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In this instance, therefore, apology acts a precursor to, rather than a corollary of, 
the inquiry process. In relation to the Church, however, public apologies are 
typically less forthcoming and are usually only dispensed, if at all, following the 
formal adjudication of guilt and the bringing to bear of significant public pressure. 
Both of these circumstances are illustrative of the limitations of legalistic and 
formulaic expressions of institutional regret176 and the difficulties of achieving 
‘open dialogue and constructive shaming’177 between victims and offenders. 
Despite these historic complexities surrounding apologies by the Church in 
particular, we contend that there is clear scope for establishing space for apology 
between victims and offenders as part of a restorative process within the broader 
public inquiry framework. This is achievable during the public inquiry process 
with a public acknowledgement of the harm done (including by denial and 
collusion) and a genuine expression of remorse by the offender as part of the 
restorative dialogue. Public recognition of wrongdoing in the context of 
institutional clerical abuse is inherently problematic because it poses a threat to 
both the collective identity of the Church and its ethical norms as well as to the 
‘imagined selves’178 of offenders as members of religious orders. However, while 
apologies may also be given to victims in private, it is the public nature of 
apology that may ultimately confirm ethical and social norms and validate efforts 
aimed at correcting any perceived wrongdoing.179 This could be given at the end 
of the restorative process as a component of the public inquiry as outlined below. 
This optimal version of apology, therefore, emerges not only as the crucial factor 
in the healing of victims, but as a powerful symbol of the public and self-shaming 
of the offender.180 
V Incorporating Restorative Justice: Opportunities, 
Challenges and Limitations 
A Combining the Paradigms 
In advocating the incorporation of a restorative justice process into the public 
inquiry model, it is acknowledged that both public inquiries and restorative 
programmes have limitations when it comes to addressing the needs of victims of 
institutional clergy abuse. As noted above, restorative processes are not 
appropriate, for example, for achieving a thorough and independent investigation 
of facts to establish truth, or arguably for determining an obligation for support by 
the State or the Church. They operate on the presumption that the offender has 
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accepted responsibility for wrongdoing and focus on the outcome or ‘penalty 
phase’.181 An adjudicatory component would more properly be dealt with 
separately under an investigative pathway, whether within a public inquiry or 
conventional civil or criminal proceedings. Offers of reparation made by offenders 
(usually the State or a religious order) to victims in the course of the restorative 
dialogue may also run counter to, or in parallel with, judicial or statutory 
compensation schemes. At the same time, the open dialogue between victim and 
abuser via restorative conferencing, leading to a transformative understanding on 
the part of the abuser of the harm committed, may also be problematic within the 
rubric of a formal public inquiry. Recognising these potential limitations, however, 
we argue here that it should be given further consideration as a possible avenue for 
appropriate cases. As such, routes in and out of restorative pathways would have to 
be carefully considered and formally governed.182 
It is our contention, therefore, that restorative justice as a response to 
institutional child abuse can usefully be incorporated within the public inquiry 
framework as part of a hybrid model and not merely as an ‘add on’ following the 
conclusion of the inquiry process. Within this hybrid model, we propose two 
pathways for providing restorative, victim-centred components of a public inquiry. 
In addition to the ‘confidential committee’ stage, which already provides 
opportunities for the victim’s voice to be heard and for the compilation of a public 
record of narratives, victims could choose either an ‘investigatory’ route, with a 
view to adversarial fact-finding and possible prosecution, or a ‘restorative’ route, 
as an alternative gateway to conferencing with willing offenders. As with all 
restorative processes, the starting point would be the readiness of the victim to take 
an alternative pathway on a consensual basis, together with the willingness of the 
offender to accept responsibility for the harm caused and to participate in the 
restorative pathway.183 Procedures for the selection of cases and referral into the 
restorative route could be mainstreamed as part of the overall inquiry framework 
with statutory based criteria and formal procedures. 
The restorative route in the hybrid public inquiry model would provide a 
vital alternative avenue for addressing a broader range of victim needs and 
expectations that is currently absent from inquiry processes. We now turn to 
specific challenges in the proposed model, including procedural protections for 
offenders (and victims) and pragmatic considerations of identifying relevant 
offenders, institutions, and victims. 
B ‘Use Immunity’ 
A detailed exposition of the schematics of a hybrid public inquiry model is beyond 
the scope of this article, but the following analysis provides some fundamentals in 
terms of how this process could operate in practice. As noted above, it is envisaged 
that the restorative component would run concurrently with an investigatory route 
whereby victims would be offered a restorative route in lieu of an investigatory 
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process. At present, within the context of the inquiry model in both Northern 
Ireland and Australia, victims are asked to choose either a confidential 
committee/acknowledgment forum process where they are given the chance to 
recount their experiences or an investigatory/formal inquiry process that brings 
with it the full legal apparatus of the adversarial system. We contend that victims 
should not be presented with this stark choice at the outset of the process, but that 
instead a two-tier process should operate whereby following any participation in an 
acknowledgement forum, victims are then asked to choose between either ‘formal’ 
or ‘informal’ justice. Such a system would protect the victim’s right to choose 
which mode of participation best suits their needs. As noted above, one of the 
defining features of restorative justice is ‘the balance of interests’ principle and the 
need to give due weight to the multiple interests at stake in the process.184  
In particular, therefore, for individual cases, diversion into a restorative pathway 
must sit alongside, but cannot be followed consecutively with, a formal 
investigatory process. To do otherwise would be to undermine the due process 
rights of offenders. It is a key procedural concern of critics of restorative justice,185 
for example, that offenders could be subjected to multiple processes at the whim of 
individual victims. 
In relation to safeguarding the procedural rights of offenders, ‘use 
immunity’ — the guarantee of non-prosecution, where amnesty is traded for truth 
— is a long established element of the public inquiry within British law. The 
underlying rationale is that as individuals are compelled to cooperate with the 
inquiry process, the privilege against self-incrimination is offered as a recompense, 
though often they can still be prosecuted on the evidence of others.186 Extending 
this framework further, we propose that if an offender agreed to a restorative 
process, he or she would be offered a guarantee of total immunity from future 
criminal or civil liability in exchange for ‘truth’ and full disclosure about the past. 
The formal justice system and referral back to the inquiry process, however, could 
operate as a fall-back position as part of an ‘enforcement pyramid’ for those 
offenders who are unwilling to engage fully with restorative processes.187 
Evidence of such engagement could include, for example, full and public 
acknowledgement of harm as well as the official acceptance of accountability. 
While on one level closing down future adversarial processes may not rest easily 
with victim advocates, such an approach accords with what victims want from 
justice or redress processes as outlined above. In the context of clergy abuse, there 
has been vigorous institutional resistance to admitting wrongdoing by clergy (via, 
for example, removing priests between parishes or dioceses, or defending civil 
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actions).188 Replacing an investigatory/prosecutorial route with a restorative one 
would also offer a practical means of engaging offenders (or institutional 
representatives) more fully in the justice process. 
The restorative component could take the form of conferencing, whereby 
victims and their supporters meet offenders in the presence of a trained arbitrator to 
facilitate a process of dialogue about the offence, and to agree on some form of 
reparation on the part of the offender, which may be in the form of an apology.189 
Such sessions would be held in private, although as contended above, this could be 
followed by an open expression of remorse in the form of a public apology to 
victims as part of the agreed reparation. Critics of restorative justice have argued 
that the right to legal advice is perhaps the most important due process check on 
the process and outcomes, given that the offender may effectively confess to the 
commission of an offence.190 In this vein, access to legal advice would be an 
important element at the outset of the process in giving offenders advice on the 
nature of the immunity agreement and the consequences of not fully cooperating 
with the process. As offenders would be protected from future prosecution under 
the proposed model, however, there would be no need for formal legal 
representation during the restorative process. Moreover, removing lawyers and 
other adversarial imperatives (such as the rules of evidence and proof) from the 
proposed restorative justice process helps to safeguard against partisan, advisory 
and representative roles that may monopolise the process and reduce the offenders’ 
involvement and the opportunity to confront their offending and take responsibility 
for their actions.191 Financial redress schemes, which typically operate alongside or 
in the aftermath of a public inquiry process, could continue to operate following 
the conclusion of the restorative component. 
C Pragmatic Concerns 
Enacting a restorative justice component as part of a public inquiry is likely to face 
several pragmatic challenges stemming from the organisational nature of offending 
and the collective nature of victimhood. First, effective reintegrative shaming, as 
part of the restorative model, depends on the public expression of remorse and 
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commitment to repairing the harm done.192 The absence of such remorse may 
result in incomplete catharsis for some victims. A referral process from the public 
inquiry will also be dependent on an admission by the offender.193 As noted above, 
the Catholic Church has exerted significant pressure to defend allegations in the 
face of their potential enormous financial liability.194 Individual priests may have 
little choice about acknowledging or taking part in restorative programmes. Much 
will depend, therefore, on the willingness of the institutional church to accept 
restorative programmes and allow individual clergy to take part.195 
Second, and following on from the previous point, the institutional 
character of clerical abuse undoubtedly makes the issues much more complex. By 
way of example, there are additional complications in identifying who is the 
relevant ‘offender’ in complex forms of institutional child abuse where the Church 
ran institutions on behalf of the State. Equally, where the offender is a State-like 
institution such as the Catholic Church — highly bureaucratic and hierarchical — 
there may be heightened concerns about such authorities monopolising the process. 
Moreover, perpetrators of historical abuse may no longer be alive. The use of 
church representatives as ‘surrogate offenders’ as suggested by some writers,196 
may deprive the victim of direct confrontation with those who have inflicted harm 
upon them. However, as other scholars have contended, restorative approaches can 
and do operate effectively in both individual as well as organisational contexts.197 
Such concerns may be managed when programmes follow closely the 
well-recognised restorative principles and respect and protect the rights of all 
participants as parties affected by the harms surrounding institutional child abuse. 
Third, institutional child abuse typically involves the abuse of multiple 
victims, and often multiple perpetrators, over a period of time198 with the setting up 
of the inquiry acting as a locus of collective action and mutual support.  
In affording individual victims the choice of pursuing a restorative route, there is 
also the risk of victims feeling pressured into following a particular pathway in the 
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event of disagreement among victims. This pressure may stem from the possibility 
of disenfranchisement from the wider group of victims and, as a result, the fear of 
society minimising or failing to attach sufficient weight to their individual harm 
and suffering. Such difficulties may be particularly acute when there are 
formalised networks and support groups for survivors who maintain an often 
vociferous media presence emphasising collective harm. In the model envisaged 
here, however, restorative processes would operate as part of the rubric of statutory 
inquiries. As Hudson has argued, formal law, therefore, could stand behind 
restorative justice procedures as a guarantor of rights that cannot be overridden by 
decisions arrived at by consensus or majority.199 While some victims may wish to 
pursue a restorative route and others an investigatory route, each case of 
victimisation by an offender must be taken on an individual basis. Although, on 
one level, this may raise pragmatic concerns of subjecting an individual offender to 
dual processes across a range of cases with a number of different victims, 
ultimately this would facilitate greater offender accountability linked to individual 
cases. Moreover, it should mean that a victim’s right to choose one or other avenue 
would be protected against an opposing group or community view, and that his or 
her choice would be guaranteed against oppression by a stronger advocate. 
VI Conclusion 
This analysis has proposed that an amalgam of restorative justice and the public 
inquiry model offers a unique set of opportunities and an alternative means of 
achieving justice for victims of institutional child abuse. In the face of the 
ever-expanding international crisis of responding to historical abuse, it has been 
argued that a synthesis of formal regulatory powers with restorative problem-
solving approaches200 would engender a more collaborative inquiry process that 
better meets the affective and expressive needs of victims. The advantages of this 
type of model over simple arbitration or mediation — and over individual civil or 
criminal litigation — is that it takes place within the framework of the public 
inquiry model, thereby retaining its important public and political functions as a 
demonstration of the State’s commitment to addressing systemic wrongs. At the 
same time, it also addresses the inherent weaknesses of public inquiries in terms of 
securing wider victim participation and offender accountability via meaningful 
engagement with the justice process. 
At the conceptual level, this approach carries potent implications for the 
advancement of what has been termed a ‘maximalist’ version of restorative 
justice.201 A broadly punitive penal climate has, to date, hampered the expansion 
of restorative justice — confining it, by and large, to lower level forms of 
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offending.202 Restorative justice has, however, been used as a response to serious 
human rights abuses and political violence such as those in South Africa, 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland.203 It has also been the underpinning philosophy of 
circles of support and accountability used on an ad hoc basis in Canada, England 
and Wales and elsewhere in the reintegration of high-risk sex offenders.204 
Within this broader context, we therefore propose extending restorative justice as 
a mainstream response to one of the most serious forms of harm: historical 
institutional child abuse, with its complex emotional and psychological 
dynamics. Such an application would underscore the legitimacy of the restorative 
paradigm and further its recognition as a mainstream response to serious forms 
of offending behaviour. 
At a pragmatic level, this analysis has offered important insights for other 
jurisdictions seeking to respond to institutional child abuse and come to terms with 
the legacy of past abuses. The model adopted, however, would require nuanced 
understanding of localised contexts and ‘a close grasp of ... “imagined” politics’.205 
As Lawry-White has acknowledged more broadly in relation to the reparative 
effect of truth-seeking, ‘one size does not fit all’ so that ‘the “therapeutic” element’ 
that we have argued here is integral to procedural justice, may be highly dependent 
on the victim’s cultural view of catharsis.206 Northern Ireland, for example, as a 
post-colonial paradigmatic society transitioning from serious religious and political 
conflict, generates additional cultural considerations that a contemporary settled, 
and fundamentally secular, Western democracy such as Australia does not.207  
In the former context, seeking to establish restorative schemes run in conjunction 
with the State or a State-like institution such as the Catholic Church, may raise 
crucial questions for some sectors of society relating to the legitimacy and 
authority of the process.208 On the other hand, restorative justice has been used as 
the basis of an alternative response to paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland 
where the emotional, social and political stakes are also high. Moreover, it is also 
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used in Northern Ireland with respect to youth conferencing and young people who 
have committed sexual offences.209 
At the normative level, restorative justice is a valuable prism through which 
to view institutional child abuse for transitional and non-transitional societies alike, 
and even for fields unrelated to conflict. Beyond the micro-level narratives of 
victimhood that have been the focus of this article, a restorative framework also 
opens up the possibility of countenancing meso- and macro-level narratives of 
victimhood relating to the past. As McEvoy and Mallinder have contended, the 
framework of restorative justice can be used ‘to facilitate and enhance compliance 
with the rule of law, strengthen justice norms as well as assist with broader 
processes of social and communal “dealing with the past”’.210 More recently, the 
potential cross-over between modes of addressing the past was voiced by the Lord 
Chief Justice in the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, proposing a 
non-transitional model for addressing issues arising in a transitional setting. In an 
application for judicial review of the UK’s investigatory obligations under art 2 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights211 in ‘legacy cases’ stemming from 
‘the Conflict’ His Lordship proposed that such cases would best be considered in a 
‘time bound’, judicially chaired inquiry such as under the ongoing Historical 
Institutional Abuse Inquiry model.212 
Restorative justice is also presented as a means of ‘moral repair’213 and of 
restoring trust at the interpersonal, organisational and societal levels.214 Public 
inquiries typically unveil an unprecedented scale of abuse, and of State or 
organisational complicity in that abuse. In both countries discussed here, the legacy 
of institutional child abuse has emerged as a further integral element of societal 
understanding of national identity and the process of coming to terms with the past. 
In relation to clerical abuse in particular, institutional child abuse may impact upon 
not only primary and secondary victims, but also tertiary victims and the public at 
large. Revelations about clergy sexual abuse are typically accompanied by 
widespread public outcry. Within the context of the Catholic Church, for example, 
the clerical abuse scandal has had profound implications for the Catholic 
community who have expressed ‘deep hurt’215 and spiritual damage216 in response 
to perceived betrayal by the Church. 
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The incorporation of restorative justice into official responses to crises 
such as ongoing revelations of institutional abuse in Australia and Northern 
Ireland directly engages with offending institutions and individuals. At the same 
time it offers a realistic means of promoting individual as well as institutional 
accountability and of re-establishing public trust and credibility in such figures or 
organisations.217 Reframing the justice process in this way opens up the 
possibility of bringing more perpetrators within the realms of justice, of giving 
individual victims an active role in this process and of reaffirming public 
confidence in inquiry processes. More broadly, it offers a real and viable 
opportunity of responding to the complex and pragmatic needs of victims of such 
large-scale harms. 
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